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This article provides historical account of wealth accumulation and composition in Sweden during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A detailed account on capital formation during the industrialisation process shows that produced capital grew faster than natural capital from the 1850s. Natural capital was changing from a predominance of forest towards crop land as the main asset in the early twentieth century. Produced capital was largely bounded in the agriculture sector up till the second half of the nineteenth century. Heavy investments in the infrastructure sector and later in the manufacturing section changed the produced capital structure and thereby lowered transport costs and return of investment in manufacturing and services; providing incentives for accumulating the stock of produced capital and enhance consumption and living standard. The return on capital was dispersed from the outset of the period but has converged over time.

In this article, new estimates of energy consumption in the Swedish manufacturing industry during 1800–1913 are used for interpreting the Swedish industrialisation process from an energy economic perspective. For one we conclude that the revision of previous estimates is substantial when it comes to manufacturing. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the increase of coal consumption, the expansion of the fossil or mineral energy system, to a high degree can be explained by the increased use of steam engines in manufacturing and the transport sector. Finally, we conclude that overall energy intensity patterns is largely determined by assumptions on household firewood consumption. A narrative interpretation of the interplay between energy system transformation and the industrialisation in Sweden concludes the article.

This article discusses the transformation from an organic to a mineral energy system from a Swedish historical perspective. Main arguments are that there was a dynamic interaction between the two systems during the Swedish industrialization process. For one, a diffusion of the mineral energy system contributed to opening previously inaccessible organic resources in the forest of northern Sweden. Secondly, the development of the pulp- and paper industry contributed to the switch from charcoal to coke in the iron industry. Thirdly, the development of hydropower, itself an organic source of energy, further contributed to the emergence of a mixed energy system. One can therefore see the Swedish transition from an organic to a mineral energy system as a shift from a traditional organic energy system to an industrialized organic energy system, which is to say an organic energy system which for its operation was depending on technologies and organizational structures of the mineral energy system.

It has been suggested that Swedish policy during the early post-war period was strongly directed towards mobility-increasing expenditures – most notably relocation allowances – aimed at moving labour from north to south. While this view has dominated the academic discussion on labour market policy, there is little direct evidence. We make three claims. First, the relocation allowances have to be evaluated against the regional policy. Second, by doing so we show that the mobility-oriented policy was predominant only for a short period of time: in the early 1970s, there was a decisive shift towards a policy directed at stimulating employment in the north. Third, drawing on this, we revaluate the previous view on policy making in Sweden. Our analysis suggests that the Social Democratic government acted in a voter-maximizing way. The relocation allowances were introduced at the behest of the Trade Union Confederation (LO). The regional subsidies were expanded when voter sentiment turned against the perceived depletion of rural regions. However, this strategy interacted with the political and institutional environment. The new election law in 1970 and political competition from the Centre Party pushed the Social Democrats to shift their policies on regional subsidies.

This article investigates the development of the share of women CEOs and chairpersons in knowledge intensive industries in Sweden from 2000 to 2010. The Swedish national development, covering all limited companies with a CEO, is compared to case studies of the biotech and the ICT industries, with differences in female participation in the highly educated key workforce. The results indicate an increased female representation over time on the national level, but with differences between industries, which can be related to a combination of national political pressure for increased gender equality, and industry specific differences in education level among men and women in the key workforces of the industries.

Planning the use of university faculty time and allocating it to various commitments can be challenging since university teachers typically have a complex mix of different tasks. In this context, some Swedish universities have turned towards time management software solutions as tools for planning department activities. This paper describes the implementation of a web-based time management system at a Swedish university, and discusses its consequences for workforce planning and teachers’ workload.

In this article, we argue that the regulation of the explosives industry in Sweden between 1858 and 1948 can give a slightly different perspective on regulatory capture. In this case it was the upstart company, the Nobel Dynamite Company, and not the established explosives companies that in negotiation with the regulator succeeded in establishing new national regulations. Through three different cases we show that the method behind this successful capture was indirect and direct with a common trait of risk minimizing for the public that developed in cooperation with the regulator.

This article will discuss recent and historical transformation periods within the game industry and put them in a macro-economic context. The last couple of years have been very turbulent within the game industry. Numerous game developing companies have shut down, even some of the well-established and high profile game studios have closed. Electronic Arts, Lucas Arts and Microsoft have terminated or sold many of their game studios. The highly acclaimed US studio Irrational Games announced in 2014 that it was going to close down and start a transformation into a smaller studio. Retailing has also struggled. The Scandinavian wing of the chain store GAME went bankrupt in June 2015.

This transformation comes as a number of radical (maybe even disruptive) innovations and new business models have been introduced (Baumane-Vitolina and Apsite 2013, White and Searle 2013, Hotho 2013). The new dominant paradigm is based on digital distribution and a further emphasis on networking and mobility. This have, due to scalability and low marginal costs, made new game genres e.g. indie, episodic and social games more economic and technically realistic. New ways to finance game development have also emerged e.g. crowdfunding and early access schemes. Finally we seem to be at the verge of some major technological breakthroughs in VR, open source hardware/software, voice recognition and artificial intelligence.

Schumpeterian innovation theory has become a popular way to explain and understand industry change in the last decades. This article will however focus on another aspect of this theory namely economic cycle theory. Schumpeter and other scholars argue that major technological innovations will occur in development blocks, and as a result reshape the structure of the economy. This will result in economic cycles (Schumpeter 1934 and 1939, Kondratiev 1935, Keynes 1936, Dahmen 1984). Scholars have periodised these cycles in different ways. Within the Nordic structural analytical tradition have Lennart Schön, among others, found evidence for a 40-year cycle. It is possible that the 2007-2009 financial crisis marked the beginning of a new cycle and that we have now entered a transformation period (Schön 2013). An economic crisis will accelerate the destruction of existing structures and will reallocate resources to new sectors and innovations in what Schumpeter would call a great gale of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942).

The hypothesis in this article is that cycle theory can be used to explain the development of the game industry since the 1970s. The theory may help us build a better understanding and periodization of the game industry evolution. This article will contribute to game research within the fields of history and social sciences. The article will focus on three questions in relation to the game industry. Why have so many major structural changes occurred within the game industry in recent years? Have there been similar periods historically? How can we understand and periodise major changes in technology and business models within the game industry?

This article will discuss recent and historical transformation periods within the game industry and put them in a macro-economic context. The last couple of years have been very turbulent within the game industry. Numerous game developing companies have shut down, even some of the well-established and high profile game studios have closed. Electronic Arts, Lucas Arts and Microsoft have terminated or sold many of their game studios. The highly acclaimed US studio Irrational Games announced in 2014 that it was going to close down and start a transformation into a smaller studio. Retailing has also struggled. The Scandinavian wing of the chain store GAME went bankrupt in June 2015.

This transformation comes as a number of radical (maybe even disruptive) innovations and new business models have been introduced (Baumane-Vitolina and Apsite 2013, White and Searle 2013, Hotho 2013). The new dominant paradigm is based on digital distribution and a further emphasis on networking and mobility. This have, due to scalability and low marginal costs, made new game genres e.g. indie, episodic and social games more economic and technically realistic. New ways to finance game development have also emerged e.g. crowdfunding and early access schemes. Finally, we seem to be at the verge of some major technological breakthroughs in VR, open source hardware/software, voice recognition and artificial intelligence.

Schumpeterian innovation theory has become a popular way to explain and understand industry change in the last decades. This article will however focus on another aspect of this theory namely economic cycle theory. Schumpeter and other scholars argue that major technological innovations will occur in development blocks, and as a result reshape the structure of the economy. This will result in economic cycles (Schumpeter 1934 and 1939, Kondratiev 1935, Keynes 1936, Dahmen 1984). Scholars have periodised these cycles in different ways. Within the Nordic structural analytical tradition have Lennart Schön, among others, found evidence for a 40-year cycle. It is possible that the 2007-2009 financial crisis marked the beginning of a new cycle and that we have now entered a transformation period (Schön 2013). An economic crisis will accelerate the destruction of existing structures and will reallocate resources to new sectors and innovations in what Schumpeter would call a great gale of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942).

The hypothesis in this article is that cycle theory can be used to explain the development of the game industry since the 1970s. The theory may help us build a better understanding and periodization of the game industry evolution. This article will contribute to game research within the fields of history and social sciences. The article will focus on three questions in relation to the game industry. Why have so many major structural changes occurred within the game industry in recent years? Have there been similar periods historically? How can we understand and periodise major changes in technology and business models within the game industry?

The video game industry has today established itself as one of the largest entertainment industries. It is, just as the films industry, producing a product that is dependent on both artistic knowledge and business knowledge. Today the industry are suffering from a creative inability when it comes to the actual games – although it manages to find all the more creativity when it comes to finding successful business models. This paper reports on a longer study of Swedish game developers and how they find a way to distribute games in a market moving from the physical to the digital.Introduction

The aim of this article is to describe the gender segregation and the existing barriers preventing a more equal gender representation within the Swedish game development industry. There has always been a strong belief in computer technology and new information technology and its potential to create a more equal and democratic society. These hopes have rarely materialized. Instead the same problems remain. Digital games are currently one of the most important popular cultural commodities and affect many people both young and old. This study shows that although the industry has expanded rapidly, the gender segregation is still comprehensive. There seems to be three kinds of obstacles to a greater integration. The first kind are structural problems surrounding how companies are established and how they expand. The second kind are internal factors like workload, negative jargon and the kind of games that are games created. Finally there are problems related to external conditions such as education and the game culture as a whole. These barriers seem to reproduce gender imbalance and create a complex system where multiple changes are required to achieve a positive development and gender balance within the industry.

Planning the use of university faculty time and allocating it to various tasks can be challenging since university teachers typically have a complex mix of different tasks that also often change. In this context, some Swedish universities have turned towards time management software solutions as tools for planning department activities. This paper describes the introduction of such a web-based time management system at a Swedish university, and reports from a system evaluation comprising interviews with department leaders and staff planners. The empirical material implies that the advent of time management systems in higher education give rise to challenges for academic leaders aiming for efficiency, transparency and control, while trying to maintain flexibility and autonomy among faculty members.

The experiences of past efforts of industrial pollution control while maintaining competitiveness should be of great value to research and policy practice addressing sustainability issues today. In this article, we analyze the environmental adaptation of the Swedish pulp industry during the period 1970–1990 as illustrated by the sulfite pulp producer Domsjö mill. We investigate how this company managed to adapt to heavy transformation pressure from increasing international competition in combination with strict national environmental regulations during the 1960s to the early 1990s. In line with the so-called Porter hypothesis, the company was able to coordinate the problems that were environmental in nature with activities aiming at production efficiency goals and the development of new products. Swedish environmental agencies and legislation facilitated this ―win-win‖ situation by a flexible but still challenging regulatory approach towards the company. From the early 1990s and onwards, the greening of the pulp industry was also a result of increased market pressure for green paper products. 

Denna studie analyserar hur frågan om fördelning och placering av räntan från de norrländska naturresurserna uppkommit, gestaltats och utvecklats av norrländska företrädare och i den nationella politiken gentemot Norrland under perioden 1850-2016. Utgångspunkten för analysen är att Norrlands utveckling under perioden följer ett mönster som visar stora likheter med vad andra naturresursrika regioner i världen upplevt. Samtidigt har det norrländska förloppet även präglats av unika aspekter relaterade till den svenska välfärdsstatens utveckling samt den svenska ekonomins position i internationell ekonomi under 1900-talet.

Inledningsvis visar vi hur Norrland från 1850 fram till omkring 1940 följde ett mönster för en naturresursrik region i enlighet med vad nordamerikanska ekonomisk-historiker som Douglass C. North och Harold A. Innis beskriver. Naturresursexporten expanderade kraftigt men produktionen kom till följd av regionens alltför svaga strukturer för finansiering och ägande att hamna under exogena aktörer. Genom arbetet med att attrahera investeringar till Norrland kom regionens politiska aktörer däremot att bli medvetna om hur politisk mobilisering och organisering kunde få nationalstatsnivån att tilldela Norrland olika offentliga resurser. Perioden från 1940 till 1990 kännetecknades sedan av en rent-seeking-strategi vars mål var att indirekt återföra delar av den ”förlorade” naturresursräntan till Norrland genom agerande inom det politiska systemet. Norrlandskommitténs betänkande från 1949 satte dagordningen för denna strategi. Ett avgörande argument för en expansion av den statliga Norrlandspolitiken i storlek och omfattning från 1940-talet blev att regionen förtjänade kompensation för den naturresursränta som dittills ofta tillfallit exogena aktörer. Den politiska strategin, där naturresursräntan kopplas samman med offentliga utgifter, blev med tiden så dominerande att den nästan helt trängt undan alternativa utvecklingsstrategier. Det blir särskilt tydligt i vår analys av perioden efter 1990 då de dominerande regionala aktörerna inte förmådde förändra sitt agerande och målsättningar, trots att det fanns tydliga indikatorer på att den traditionella strategin borde ha ifrågasatts.

Den norrlandspolitik som utvecklats efter 1940 kan därigenom betraktas som en kompensation för oförmågan hos företagare och politiker i Norrlands eliter att uthålligt transformera förmögenheter baserade på resursräntor till nya och diversifierade verksamheter i starka urbana strukturer. Regionens politiska strategi har istället varit inriktad på att genom offentliga satsningar och transfereringar återföra räntan från naturresurserna till regionen med så begränsad påverkan på lokaliseringsmönstret som möjligt. Naturresursräntan har använts till att säkra väljarbasen för de politiska eliternas strukturer i allians med den naturresursintensiva basindustrins företrädare och ägare. Därmed har inte heller en förskjutning av fokus i Norrland, en strukturomvandling, från naturresursutvinning till en placering av räntan i urbant lokaliserade förädlande näringar varit aktuell. En starkare direkt regional och icke-politiskt bestämd kontroll av räntan t.ex. via ett decentraliserat ägande av aktier i naturresursnäringar och fastigheter har istället vanligen avvisats av de aktörer som formulerat regionens problem och agenda.

Denna studie analyserar hur frågan om fördelning och placering av räntan från de norrländska naturresurserna uppkommit, gestaltats och utvecklats av norrländska företrädare och i den nationella politiken gentemot Norrland under perioden 1850-2016. Utgångspunkten för analysen är att Norrlands utveckling under perioden följer ett mönster som visar stora likheter med vad andra naturresursrika regioner i världen upplevt. Samtidigt har det norrländska förloppet även präglats av unika aspekter relaterade till den svenska välfärdsstatens utveckling samt den svenska ekonomins position i internationell ekonomi under 1900-talet.

Inledningsvis visar vi hur Norrland från 1850 fram till omkring 1940 följde ett mönster för en naturresursrik region i enlighet med vad nordamerikanska ekonomisk-historiker som Douglass C. North och Harold A. Innis beskriver. Naturresursexporten expanderade kraftigt men produktionen kom till följd av regionens alltför svaga strukturer för finansiering och ägande att hamna under exogena aktörer. Genom arbetet med att attrahera investeringar till Norrland kom regionens politiska aktörer däremot att bli medvetna om hur politisk mobilisering och organisering kunde få nationalstatsnivån att tilldela Norrland olika offentliga resurser. Perioden från 1940 till 1990 kännetecknades sedan av en rent-seeking-strategi vars mål var att indirekt återföra delar av den ”förlorade” naturresursräntan till Norrland genom agerande inom det politiska systemet. Norrlandskommitténs betänkande från 1949 satte dagordningen för denna strategi. Ett avgörande argument för en expansion av den statliga Norrlandspolitiken i storlek och omfattning från 1940-talet blev att regionen förtjänade kompensation för den naturresursränta som dittills ofta tillfallit exogena aktörer. Den politiska strategin, där naturresursräntan kopplas samman med offentliga utgifter, blev med tiden så dominerande att den nästan helt trängt undan alternativa utvecklingsstrategier. Det blir särskilt tydligt i vår analys av perioden efter 1990 då de dominerande regionala aktörerna inte förmådde förändra sitt agerande och målsättningar, trots att det fanns tydliga indikatorer på att den traditionella strategin borde ha ifrågasatts.

Den norrlandspolitik som utvecklats efter 1940 kan därigenom betraktas som en kompensation för oförmågan hos företagare och politiker i Norrlands eliter att uthålligt transformera förmögenheter baserade på resursräntor till nya och diversifierade verksamheter i starka urbana strukturer. Regionens politiska strategi har istället varit inriktad på att genom offentliga satsningar och transfereringar återföra räntan från naturresurserna till regionen med så begränsad påverkan på lokaliseringsmönstret som möjligt. Naturresursräntan har använts till att säkra väljarbasen för de politiska eliternas strukturer i allians med den naturresursintensiva basindustrins företrädare och ägare. Därmed har inte heller en förskjutning av fokus i Norrland, en strukturomvandling, från naturresursutvinning till en placering av räntan i urbant lokaliserade förädlande näringar varit aktuell. En starkare direkt regional och icke-politiskt bestämd kontroll av räntan t.ex. via ett decentraliserat ägande av aktier i naturresursnäringar och fastigheter har istället vanligen avvisats av de aktörer som formulerat regionens problem och agenda.